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1 BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Case No. 920500-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final Order of the District 
Court for the First Judicial District of the State of Utah, in 
and for Cache County. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
because the appeal was assigned to it by the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Should the terra "proceeds" as used in the Washington 
State Decree of Dissolution be interpreted to include the 
total amount received by Parish under a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract for the sale of the parties' home and is Donahue 
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the total amount received by 
Parish under the Promissory Note and Contract? 
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Does Utah law permit the Trial Court to apply the 
Washington State statutory prejudgment interest of twelve 
percent (12%) to a judgment which is rendered and entered in 
Utah, or should Utah statutory prejudgment rate of ten percent 
(10%) be applied? 
Should the Trial Court have allowed Donahue to call Rex 
Fuhriman as a witness to explain to the Trial Court his expert 
interpretation of the term "proceeds?" 
The standard of review concerning each of these issues is 
the correctness of the Trial Court's ruling. See Mountain 
Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988) 
and Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are subject to 
interpretation by this Court: 
Section 15-1-1(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract 
specify a different rate of interest, the legal 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action shall be ten 
percent (10%) per annum. 
19.52.010 (1), Revised Code of Washington: 
(1) Every loan or forbearance of money, goods, 
or thing in action shall bear interest at the rate 
of twelve percent per annum where no different rate 
is agreed to in writing between the parties: 
Provided, That with regard to any transaction 
heretofore or hereafter entered into subject to 
this section, if an agreement in writing between 
the parties evidencing such transaction provides 
for the payment of money at the end of an agreed 
period of time or in installments over an agreed 
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period of time, then such agreement shall 
constitute a writing for purposes of this section 
and satisfy the requirements thereof. The 
discounting of commercial paper, where the borrower 
makes himself liable as maker, guarantor, or 
indorser, shall be considered as a loan for the 
purposes of this chapter. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE AND COURSE OF THE CASE 
Thomas Donahue, Plaintiff and Appellant, brought an 
action against Grace Parish, Defendant and Appellee, for 
fraud, declaratory judgment and division of proceeds from the 
sale of the parties' home in Logan, Utah. Donahue and Parish 
were divorced in Washington on October 20, 1980. The Decree 
of Dissolution divided several properties of the parties 
located in Cache County, Utah. Donahue's actions against 
Parish for fraud and declaratory judgment were dismissed on 
summary judgment by the District Court. Donahue's claim for 
the division of proceeds from the sale of the Logan home was 
reserved for trial. Parish counterclaimed for unpaid alimony 
and a trial was held in the First Judicial District Court, 
Cache County, Utah on December 17, 1991. 
The Trial Court determined that the "proceeds" as set 
forth in the Washington State Decree of Dissolution meant the 
purchase price on the date the house in Logan, Utah was sold 
and did not include the interest income on the sale proceeds 
pursuant to the Real Estate Contract. The Trial Court also 
ruled that the Washington State statute concerning prejudgment 
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interest of twelve percent (12%) applied and not the Utah 
State prejudgment rate of ten percent (10%) towards any 
judgment of Parish against Donahue for unpaid alimony. The 
Trial Court refused to allow Rex Fuhriman to testify at the 
trial to explain his interpretation of the term "proceeds." 
Consequently, Donahue filed the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Donahue and Parish were married to each other on or about 
October 4, 1952. In 1969, the parties acquired a house in 
Logan, Utah in which they resided until 1980. In 1980, the 
parties moved to the State of Washington; however, they did 
not sell their home in Logan, Utah, until June 30, 1985. 
(Record at 85.) 
In 1980, Parish filed for divorce in the Superior Court 
in Washington for King County. Parish was represented by an 
attorney in the divorce action but Donahue was not. The 
parties were divorced on October 20, 1980 pursuant to a Decree 
of Dissolution. Parish was granted a default divorce against 
Donahue. (Record at 10.) 
Concerning the parties' house in Logan, Utah, the Decree 
of Dissolution provided that it was awarded to Parish under 
the following conditions and restrictions: 
B, The home located in Logan, Utah, which 
home should be sold and after payment of closing 
costs and underlying mortgage payment, the proceeds 
divided equally between Petitioner 
(Defendant/Appellee) and Respondent 
(Plaintiff/Appellant). Each party should be 
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required to bear any capital gains that may be 
occasioned proportionately with the respective 
proceeds that each has paid and further that 
Respondent is to pay all taxes owing, pertaining to 
said property, up to the date of the closing of the 
sale. 
See copy of the Decree of Dissolution which is attached hereto 
in the Addendum and was Exhibit 1 at the trial on December 17, 
1991. 
On page 2 of the Decree of Dissolution, Donahue was 
awarded as his sole and separate property as follows: 
C. An equal share in the proceeds of the home 
located in Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions 
as heretofore set forth. 
See copy of the Decree of Dissolution which is attached in the 
Addendum hereto. 
On June 30, 1985, the house in Logan, Utah was sold on a 
Real Estate Contract. (Record at 85.) The total purchase 
price was $68,000.00. (Record at 15.) The Contract was 
entered into between the Purchaser and Parish only. See Real 
Estate Contract which was Exhibit 3. Under the Contract, 
Parish received $15,000.00 as a down payment on June 30, 1985 
from which closing costs and fees were subtracted in the 
amount of $1,559.26 for a total net down payment of 
$13,440.74. (Record at 20.) 
The remaining indebtedness of $53,000.00 was to bear 
interest at ten percent (10%) per annum and to be paid 
pursuant to a Promissory Note which is due in full on August 
1, 2000. (Record at 15.) A copy of the Promissory Note and 
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Real Estate Contract were Trial Exhibits 2 and 3, respectfully 
at the trial on December 17, 1991. 
The Real Estate Contract and Promissory Note requires 
that Parish receive from the Buyers a monthly payment of 
$515.81, which she has received since August 1, 1985 and a 
larger payment of $5,250.00 was received by Parish on January 
1, 1986. (Record at 15 and 23.) At the time of the trial of 
this matter in December, 1991, Parish had received seventy-
eight (78) monthly payments and the January 1, 1986 payment of 
$5,250.00 for a total amount of payments received by Parish of 
$45,483.18. When the payments through December 17, 1991 were 
added together with the net down payment to Parish of 
$13,440.74, Parish had received $58,923.74 at the time of 
trial in December, 1991. (Record at 23.) 
Donahue has not received any portion of the down paym€*nt 
or monthly payments under the Real Estate Contract. (Record 
at 20.) All of the down payment and monthly payments from the 
sale of the home have been received by Parish. (Record at 
21.) 
The total amount of principal and interest to be paid by 
the Purchaser to Parish under the Promissory Note is 
$114,820.94. 
The Decree of Dissolution provided that Donahue was to 
pay alimony to Parish in the amount of $860.00 per month which 
was to terminate upon Parish's remarriage or death. (Record at 
24.) See copy of Decree of Dissolution attached to the 
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Addendum hereto. Donahue paid some alimony to Parish; 
however, he was not current in his alimony obligation to 
Parish. Exhibit 4 of Trial Record shows the claimed payments 
of Donahue to Parish. Donahue claimed he owed Parish 
$33,655.00 in alimony at the trial. (Record at 41.) Parish 
introduced evidence that Donahue had failed to make alimony 
payments with interest at twelve percent (12%) in the amount 
of $50,079.02. See Exhibit 15 of Trial Record. 
Parish remarried on March 19, 1986 terminating the 
alimony obligation of Donahue. (Record at 92.) 
Donahue filed an Amended Complaint which sought the 
Court's determination of the term "proceeds" from the sale of 
the home and Parish counterclaimed for alimony arrears. A 
trial was held on December 17, 1991 and at the trial the 
District Court Judge accepted Parish's argument that the share 
of Donahue of the Real Estate Contract as of the date of the 
sale on June 30, 1985 was $66,389.95 which would entitle 
Donahue to one-half (1/2) of that or $33,192.48. The Trial 
Court found that alimony arrearages with interest at twelve 
percent (12%) were $50,079.02 resulting in a judgment against 
Donahue of $16,886.84. (Record at 140 and 141.) The Trial 
Court terminated any right, title and interest that Donahue 
had in the home and awarded the home to Parish together with 
a judgment in the amount of $16,886.54. (Record at 146.) 
See copy of Court's Order which is attached in the Addendum 
hereto. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Washington State Decree of Dissolution provides that 
the "proceeds from the sale of the home" are to be divided 
between Donahue and Parish. Donahue submits to the Court that 
proceeds are the total amount that is received under the Real 
Estate Contract and Promissory Note, which would include all 
of the principal and interest for the full term of the Real 
Estate Contract. Donahue should receive one-half (1/2) of the 
total amount received under the Real Estate Contract. 
The judgment which was entered against Donahue in favor 
or Parish for unpaid alimony accrued interest as ordered by 
the Trial Court at the Washington State prejudgment interest 
rate of twelve percent (12%). This is a Utah judgment and the 
legal rate of interest for judgments rendered in the State of 
Utah should be the statutory Utah rate of ten percent (10%) 
per annum pursuant o Utah Code Annotated, 515-1-1 and not 
according to the Wasnington State statute. 
The Trial Court wrongfully refused to allow Mr. Rex 
Fuhriman to testify at the trial to explain his interpretation 
of the term "proceeds" as an expert witness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TERM "PROCEEDS OF SALE" AS SET FORTH IN THE 
WASHIK 'TON STATE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION SHOULD BE 
INTERI 2TED TO INCLUDE THE FULL AMOUNT OF MONEYS 
ACTUA1 .Y RECEIVED BY PARISH, AND DONAHUE IS 
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE AN OFFSET AGAINST THE UNPAID 
ALIMONY FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVED BY PARISH UP 
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TO THE DATE OF TRIAL AND IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE HIS 
ONE-HALF OF ANY REMAINING PROCEEDS WHICH SHOULD BE 
APPLIED AGAINST THE UNPAID ALIMONY BALANCE. 
The Washington State Superior Court ordered in Paragraph 
B of the Decree of Dissolution that the parties' home in 
Logan, Utah was to be sold and "... after payment of closing 
costs and underlying mortgage payment, the proceeds divided 
equally between Petitioner and Respondent." Paragraph B of 
the Decree of Dissolution further provided that each party was 
to be responsible for any capital gains "... that may be 
occasioned proportionately with respect to the respective 
proceeds that each has paid and further that Respondent is to 
pay all taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the 
date of closing of sale." See copy of Decree of Dissolution 
which was Exhibit 1 in trial record. On page 2 of the Decree 
of Dissolution, the Court awards property to Donahue and 
states in paragraph C as follows: "An equal share in the 
proceeds of the home located in Logan, Utah, on the terms and 
conditions as heretofore set forth." 
Therefore, Donahue was to receive under the Decree of 
Dissolution one-half (1/2) of the proceeds from the sale of 
the home located in Logan, Utah. The issue facing the Trial 
Court was the definition of the term "proceeds." The Trial 
Court found that the term "proceeds" means the total amount of 
the sale on the date of sale of the home minus any closing 
costs. The Trial Court would not include the total amount of 
money received by the parties for the sale of the home over 
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the term of the Real Estate Contract. Order dated March 9, 
1992, paragraphs 5 and 7. 
The Washington State Decree of Dissolution was granted to 
Parish as a default divorce. She was represented by an 
attorney. Donahue was not represented by counsel. Parish's 
attorney prepared the Decree of Dissolution. Any mistakes or 
ambiguities contained in the Decree of Dissolution should be 
construed against Parish. 
Generally, "proceeds" are defined as "the amount 
proceeding or accruing from some possession or transaction." 
72 Corpus Juris Secundum, Proceeds, page 973. Furthermore# it 
is generally held that when the term "proceeds" is implied 
with reference to a sale, "it usually means the entire 
proceeds, that is, all that was received from the sale." 72 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Proceeds, pages 973-974. 
In a Utah case concerning the definition of "proceeds" 
involving taxes, the Utah Supreme Court found that the term 
"gross proceeds realized" as used in the Utah Code, "means the 
total or whole amount in money, or other things of value, that 
has been realized or which the owner may receive or take 
possession of at his pleasure, or in which he is entitled upon 
demand and which accrues to him from the sale or conversion 
into money or its equivalent of ores extracted from the mine 
or mining claim." United States Smelting, Refining & Min. Co. 
v. Haynes, 176 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1947). 
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In the case of Furst & Thomas v. Elliott. 56 P.2d 1064 
(Idaho 1936)/ the Idaho Supreme Court defined the word 
"proceeds" as used in a contract between two parties. The 
Idaho Supreme Court went on to hold that the definition of the 
term "proceeds" depends on the intention of the parties, which 
is to be determined by all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. Furst & Thomas v. Elliott. 56 P.2d at 1069. 
Furthermore, the Idaho State Supreme Court went on to set 
forth the following definition: "The proceeds of a sale means 
the entire proceeds." Furst & Thomas v. Elliott. 56 P.2d at 
1068. 
In a divorce case decided in the State of Washington, the 
Washington Court of Appeals was required to define the term 
"proceeds" where a lien had been granted in favor of a 
divorced husband against the sale proceeds of a home which was 
awarded to the wife. The Washington Court of Appeals held 
that the husband's lien on the home was limited in its terms 
to the proceeds "of any sale, if the home was ever sold." The 
Washington Court of Appeals went on to hold that "proceeds of 
sale in this context means moneys actually received by the 
seller." Kshensky v. Pioneer Nat. Title Ins. Co.. 592 P.2d 
667, 669 (Wash. App. 1979). 
Clearly, the law in the State of Utah and from various 
Jurisdictions generally provides that the term "proceeds" 
means all that is received from the sale. It is not limited 
to a certain date or a certain amount. 
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In this case, the house in Logan, Utah was sold on a Real 
Estate Contract and Promissory Note. (See Exhibit 2 of Trial 
Record.) The purchase price of the home was $68,000.00, which 
was to accrue interest at ten percent (10%) per annum. Parish 
received a down payment of $15,000.00 and another payment of 
$5,250.00 on January 1, 1986. The remainder of the unpaid 
balance was paid at $515.81 per month beginning August, 1985, 
and was to be paid in full on August 1, 2000. (Record at 15.) 
The closing costs for the sale were $1,558.26. (Record at 
19.) The total proceeds during the term of the Promissory 
Note and Real Estate Contract would realize $114,820.94 to 
Donahue and Parish. 
The Trial Court Judge defined "proceeds" as being the 
present value of the sale of the home in June, 1985, which 
gave Donahue a setoff of $33,192.48. The Trial Court did not 
consider the interest on the monthly payments that had been 
made to Parish or the interest and payments that would be made 
to her through the term of the Promissory Note until August 1, 
2000. The offset ordered by the Trial Court did not include 
the additional payments that Parish had received through the 
date of trial on December 17, 1991, and the payments that 
Parish was to receive through August 1, 2000. 
The Trial Court found that Donahue owed Parish $50,079.02 
for unpaid alimony and interest at twelve percent (12%). 
(Record at 140 and 141.) At the trial, evidence was presented 
that the total amount of money received by Parish from the 
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date of sale to the date of trial was $58,923.74. Donahue's 
and Parish's share of that total amount received would be 
$29/461.87. (Record at 23.) Therefore, Donahue should have 
been given a credit against the alimony arrearages in the 
amount of $29,461.87. This is consistent with the definition 
of "proceeds" which would be the total amount realized by 
Parish as of the date of trial. Also, Donahue should have 
received interest on his share of the amounts that had not 
been paid by Parish to Donahue, especially in light of the 
fact that the Court awarded interest on the alimony not paid 
by Donahue to Parish. 
The balance of the payments pursuant to the Promissory 
Note and Real Estate Contract for the purchase of the home 
from December, 1991 through August, 2000, is $36,506.84. The 
District Court should have allowed Donahue to receive one-half 
(1/2) of the remaining monthly payments of $515.81 until the 
loan balance is paid in full in August, 2000. This would 
allow an offset towards the alimony judgment entered against 
Donahue. 
By accounting for the total proceeds (i.e. all of the 
payments, interest and receipts in this matter) the Trial 
Court would have taken into consideration the total amount of 
moneys or proceeds received and to be received by the parties 
under the Real Estate Contract. An interpretation of the word 
"proceeds" in this matter would allow Donahue to receive one-
half (1/2) of the remaining amounts to be paid under the Real 
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Estate Contract or, in turn, allow him to have one-half (1/2) 
of the remaining amounts applied towards his alimony judgment. 
Also, it would take into consideration the possibility of 
foreclosure if the purchaser of the home failed to make the 
payments. This is a very real possibility, particularly in 
light of the fact that Parish testified at the trial that 
payments on the home were four months in arrears. (Record at 
85.) If the home was taken back because of a default of 
payments by the purchasers, then Donahue and Parish would be 
able to re-sell the home and receive more gain or income from 
the proceeds. 
Donahue did not ask the Trial Court to consider the 
future value of the Promissory Note against the present value 
of the alimony. Donahue simply requested the Court to 
consider and interpret the definition of "proceeds" and enter 
a judgment against Donahue for the alimony that was owed after 
subtracting the total payments and interest received by Parish 
through December, 1991. Donahue further requested the Court 
to allow him to receive one-half (1/2) of the future payments 
pursuant to the Real Estate Contract and apply that towards 
his alimony judgment. An interpretation such as this would 
comply with the definitions as stated above concerning the 
term "proceeds." That is, Mr. Donahue would be given one-half 
(1/2) of the proceeds of all that was received from the sale 
of the home. 
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Donahue requests this Court to remand the issue of 
proceeds to the Trial Court for a determination that 
"proceeds" means all of moneys received by Parish under the 
Real Estate Contract and not just one-half (1/2) of the net 
sales price on the date of sale. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGFULLY APPLIED WASHINGTON 
STATE STATUTORY PREJUDGMENT RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT 
(12%) WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE UTAH STATE 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE OF TEN PERCENT (10%) 
AGAINST ANY JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DONAHUE. 
Parish filed with the Trial Court a counterclaim 
requesting a judgment against Donahue for alimony. The Trial 
Court awarded a judgment against Donahue for unpaid alimony in 
the amount of $16,886.54. The judgment included an award of 
prejudgment interest on the unpaid alimony at the Washington 
State statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) pursuant to the 
Revised Code of Washington 19.52.010. See Trial Exhibit 10. 
Counsel for Donahue objected to the application of the 
Washington statutory prejudgment rate and argued that the Utah 
statutory prejudgment rate of ten percent (10%) should be 
applied. (Record at 80.) 
Utah Code Annotated S15-l-l(2) provides as follows: 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract 
specify a different rate of interest, the legal 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action shall be ten 
percent (10%) per annum. 
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Therefore, unless parties to a contract agree to a different 
rate, the legal rate for prejudgment interest in Utah is ten 
percent (10%) per annum. Trial courts are required as a 
matter of law to award the statutorily mandated prejudgment 
rates. Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Industries. 802 P.2d 
779, 782 (Utah App. 1990). 
Other states have held that the law of the state entering 
the judgment controls the issue of prejudgment interest 
awarded. See Prospero Associates v. Redactron Corp., 682 P.2d 
1193, 1200 (Colo. App. 1983); In Re Air Crash Disaster at 
Stapleton Intern., 720 F. Supp. 1505, 1530 (D. Colo. 1989). 
The general rule is that the law of the forum applying the 
interest, determines the amount of interest unless it is 
expressly shown that a different law governs and in the case 
of doubt, the law of the forum is preferred. Gray v. Amoco 
Production Co., 564 P.2d 579, 583 (Kan. App. 1977). 
In this case, the Trial Court applied the Washington 
statutory prejudgment rate of twelve perceat (12%) to the Utah 
judgment for unpaid alimony. The Utah statutory prejudgment 
rate of ten percent (10%) should have been applied since this 
is a Utah judgment. Utah is the forum rendering the judgment 
and the laws of the State of Utah were applied in determining 
whether alimony was owed and the amount of alimony owed. 
Therefore, the Trial Court improperly applied the prejudgment 
legal rate from Washington of twelve percent (12%), when it 
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should have applied the prejudgment interest rate of ten 
percent (10%) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated S 15-1-1(2). 
Donahue requests the Court to remand this matter to the 
Trial Court for a determination of the amount of interest on 
the alimony judgment at the prejudgment interest rate of ten 
percent (10%) and not the Washington statutory rate of twelve 
percent (12%). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WRONGFULLY REFUSED TO ALLOW MR. REX 
FUHRIMAN TO TESTIFY AT THE TRIAL TO EXPLAIN HIS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "PROCEEDS" AS AN EXPERT 
WITNESS. 
At the trial, Donahue attempted to call Mr. Rex Fuhriman 
as a rebuttal witness. (Record at 125.) Parish's attorney 
objected to Mr. Fuhriman being called as a surprise witness. 
Donahue's attorney explained to the Trial Judge that Mr. 
Fuhriman was being called to assist the Court in the 
interpretation of the term "proceeds." (Record at 126.) Mr. 
Fuhriman was represented to the Court as a certified and 
licensed real estate broker. (Record at 126.) The Trial 
Judge indicated that he was familiar with Mr. Fuhriman's 
professional credentials. (Record at 127.) The Trial Court 
went on to rule that it was not concerned with Mr. Fuhriman 
being a surprise witness but went on to state as follows: 
However, the term "proceeds" as used in the Decree 
of Divorce is in fact that, a term used in the 
Decree of Divorce. And how it may or may not be 
used in the real estate world is not material. 
Objection is sustained. 
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Donahue submits to this Court that the Trial Court 
wrongfully refused to allow Mr. Rex Fuhriman to testify at the 
trial as an expert witness to assist the Court in its 
interpretation of the term "proceeds." 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as 
follows: 
If scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the trior of fact. 
At trial, Donahue was simply calling an expert who had 
specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact in the 
determination of a fact in issue, which was, the definition of 
"proceeds." Mr. Fuhriman was recognized by the Court to have 
the professional credentials as a real estate broker. (Record 
at 127.) Therefore, he had the technical or other specialized 
knowledge which would have assisted the Court as required by 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Mr. Fuhriman's testimony as an expert was intended to be 
introduced to assist the Court in the determination of the 
ultimate issue of the definition of "proceeds." Opinion 
testimony of an expert witness is not rendered inadmissible by 
the fact that it may have embraced the ultimate factual issue 
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to be decided by the trier of fact. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & 
Co., 622 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980). Therefore, Mr. 
Fuhriman's testimony cannot be excluded due to the fact that 
it was to be used to determine the ultimate issue of the 
definition of "proceeds." 
Donahue submits to this Court that the testimony of Mr. 
Fuhriman was admissible and would assist the Court in its 
interpretation of the word "proceeds." He was clearly an 
expert in the real estate area and the Court recognized his 
professional credentials. The technical or other specialized 
knowledge of Mr. Fuhriman would have assisted the Court in its 
determination of the term "proceeds." Thus, the Trial Court 
wrongfully excluded the testimony of Mr. Rex Fuhriman to 
explain his interpretation of the term "proceeds" as an expert 
witness. Donahue requests that the Court remand this matter 
to the Trial Court for another trial to allow the testimony of 
Mr. Rex Fuhriman as an expert to assist the Court in its 
interpretation of the term "proceeds." 
CONCLUSION 
Donahue submits that the Trial Court improperly 
interpreted the term "proceeds" as set forth in the Washington 
State Decree of Dissolution. The term should be interpreted 
by this Court to include all of the monies actually received 
by Parish and all of the monies that she will receive for the 
full term of the Real Estate Contract. Donahue is entitled to 
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receive an offset against the unpaid alimony for the total 
amount received by Parish up to the date of trial and he is 
entitled to receive his one-half (1/2) of any remaining 
proceeds which should be applied against the unpaid alimony 
balance. 
Donahue submits that the Trial Court improperly applied 
the Washington State statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) to 
the judgment for unpaid alimony against Donahue. The Trial 
Court should have applied the Utah State statutory prejudgment 
rate of ten percent (10%) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 15-1-1(2). 
Donahue submits that the Trial Court improperly excluded 
the testimony of Mr. Rex Fuhriman, who was a qualified expert. 
Mr. Fuhriman's testimony would have assisted the Trial Court 
in its interpretation of the term "proceeds" and the Trial 
Court should have allowed Mr. Fuhriman to testify pursuant to 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Donahue respectfully requests this Court to rule in his 
favor on the issues raised in this appeal and reverse the 
decision of the Trial Court and remand this action to the 
District Court for a further determination of the issues 
presented herein. 
DATED this ^^"~~day of October, 1992. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
/Thomas L. Willmore 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Defendant/Appellee's attorney, C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. at 
Henriksen, Henriksen & Call, 320 South 500 East, Salt Lake 




1. Decree of Dissolution of October 20, 1980, from 
the Superior Court of Washington for King County. 
2. Trial Court' s Order and Findings dated March 9, 
1992. 
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2 II OCT 2 0 1980 
3 II KING COUNTY SUPERIOR 
COURT CLERK'S OFFICE 
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5 II SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUMTY 
6 In Re the Marriage of 
7 GRACE DONOHUE, 
8 Petitioner, 
9 and 








DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
13 THIS MATTER having come on duly and regularly before the 
14 undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled court, on the 
15 date last shown below, the petitioner being represented by her 
16 counselor of law, H. Michael Fields of Anderson & Fields Inc., P.S, 
17 and respondent having failed to appear, although having been 
18 duly and personally served and the court being otherwise fully 
19 advised in the premises, having made its Findings of Face and 
20 Conclusions, now, therefore, it is hereby 
21 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the marriage of the 
22 parties be and is hereby dissolved. It is further 
23 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the wife is awarded as 
24 her sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in 
2- the husband, the following: 
26 A, Thirteen acres located located in Logan, Utah; 
27 ]! B. The home located in Logan,Utah, which home should be 
28 sold and after payment of closing costs and underlying mortgage 
payment, the proceeds divided equally between petitioner and 
respondent. Each party should be required to bear any capital 
gains that may be occasioned proportionally with the respective 
proceeds that each is paid and further that respondent is co pay 
II 
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all taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the date of 
closing of said sale, 
C. All personalty in her possession and/or under her 
respective control, including bank accounts in her name. It is 
further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that husband is awarded as 
his sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in 
the wife, the following: 
A. All personalty in his possession and or under his 
respective control, icnluding bank accounts in his name; 
B. All employment benefits which he may be entitled to 
through his employment; 
C. An equal share in the proceeds of the home located in 
Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions as heretofore set forth. 
It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that both parties are awarded 
the joint legal custody of Cody, with the primary residence for 
Cody being provided by father/respondent,with unlimited rights of 
visitation awarded to the mother. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent be and is 
hereby required to absorb the sole financial responsibility for 
the support of Cody and to pay all college expenses, including 
room and board,tuition, books, lab fees, and transportation, if 
Cody enrolls in a post-high school institution of higher learning 
or vocational institution to terminate at age twenty-two or attain 
ment of a basic degree, whichever is first to occur. It is further] 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent is to pay 
to petitioner the amount of $860 per month as and for maintenance 
to terminate only upon petition^^gemacriage or death. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of September, 1980. 
Presented by: JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER 
of ANDERSON 6c FIELDS INC., P.S. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. #1466 
Of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-4145 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS DONAHUE, ) 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. 
GRACE (DONAHUE) PARISH, ] 
Defendant. ; 
» ORDER 
| Civil NO. 870026212 DC 
I Judge Gordon J. Low 
This matter came on for trial on December 17, 1991, before 
the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge presiding. The 
Defendant was present and represented by C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., 
and the Plaintiff was present and represented by Thomas L. 
Willmore. That prior to the commencement of the proceedings, both 
parties waived any objections they may have to having the Honorable 
Gordon J. Low, District Judge, preside at these proceedings, 
including the fact that the Court had previously represented the 
Plaintiff as his attorney some years ago. 
That the Plaintiff was called and testified, and the 
Defendant was called and testified, and various exhibits were 
offered and received by the Court, and after the argument of 
counsel and after due deliberation, the Court hereby 
FINDS as follows: 
1. That the interest rate 12% per annum shall apply to 
all alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed the Defendant in this 
case pursuant to either Utah law or Washington law. 
2. That the alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed 
to the Defendant as of the date of the sale of the Logan home, once 
owned by the parties, June 30, 1985, was larger than the one-half 
(*5) of the net eguity which was to be awarded to the Plaintiff as 
set forth in Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of Dissolution. 
That as of said date, the balance owing after the one-half (h) 
equity in the home is deducted for alimony arrearages was 
$9,322.83. 
3. That the alimony arrearages owing from the Plaintiff 
to the Defendant as of February 28, 1986, the date that alimony 
payments ceased when offset against the equity of the home and the 
payments received on the Logan home, left a balance owing to the 
Defendant after the offset of $16,886.54. 
4. That if the alimony arrearages were to be calculated 
against the offset in the equity in the home up to the date of 
trial, December 17, 1991, the amount of the alimony arrearage would 
be in excess of $16,886.54. 
5. The Court finds that one-half of the sale proceeds 
from the Logan home was to be split evenly between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant pursuant to Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of 
Dissolution and was not done at the time. 
6. The Court finds that the alimony ordered by the 
Decree of Dissolution was not paid as set forth in Exhibit 15. 
7. At the time of the sale of the house in 1985 the 
Plaintiff would have been entitled to a maximum of $33,000.00, but 
at which time he was already in arrears in his alimony to a sum 
exceeding that. The best that he could hope for at that point 
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would be that when the house was sold that he either had one-half 
of the proceeds from each of the monthly installments or had the 
Defendant elected she could have paid in the $33,000.00. Since he 
was already in default in excess of that figure, his interest in 
the home at that time was liquidated and he was given credit for 
the same against the arrearages leaving a balance owed to the 
Defendant in the sum of $16,000.00. 
8. The Court finds that all interest of the Plaintiff 
is vitiated in the Logan home and all interest or equity in said 
home is completely and entirely owned by the Defendant. 
9. The Court finds that Exhibit 15 setting forth the 
calculations as to the amount of alimony paid with interest and 
the offsets is accurate. The Court finds that at least the sum of 
$16,886.54 is owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. 
10. The Court finds that the alimony did not abate 
pursuant to an alleged agreement by the Plaintiff with the 
Defendant for the reason that the Court is not convinced that any 
agreement took place, nor was there any Court Order granting such 
a modification or abatement. The Court also finds that equity does 
not justify any abatement for the Plaintiff. 
11. The Court finds that there were attorney's fees 
expended by the Defendant in the defense and prosecution of this 
matter. However, there was not sufficient evidence to establish 
bad faith or the fact that the Plaintiff had filed his non-
meritorious case and thus, no attorney's fees are awarded. 
After making said findings the Court 
CONCLUDES, ORDERS AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That all right to the interest, equity, or claim 
Plaintiff has in the equity in the Logan home once owned by the 
parties, and sold June 30, 1985, is vitiated. 
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2. That Defendant is awarded judgment against Plaintiff 
in the amount of $16,886.54, with interest from date of entry at 
12%. 
3. Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs. 
DATED this *? day of ^fht-Lcb , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
GORDON J. LOW 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this £-+P day of February, 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following individual: 
Thomas L. Willmore 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
4 
